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Institutional Context in Constitutional Law:
A Critical Examination of Term Limits, Judicial
Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances
Mark D. Rosen*
I. INTRODUCTION

Many constitutional principles apply to more than one level of government
(federal, state, local) or more than one branch of government. For example,
equal protection has been applied to both the federal government and to
cities,2 and the establishment clause has been applied to legislative and
judicial actions. 3 Call these "multi-institutional constitutional principles."
Under current doctrine, multi-institutional constitutional principles are almost
categorically presumed to operate identically to the different institutions of
government to which they apply.4 So, for example, once it had been decided
that state affirmative action programs were subject to strict scrutiny, the Court
that strict scrutiny also applied to federal
treated it as a foregone conclusion
5
affirmative action plans.
A recent article of mine ("The Surprisingly Strong Casefor Tailoring
ConstitutionalPrinciples")showed that the fact that a single constitutional
principle applies to two (or more) governmental institutions does not entail
6
that the principle need apply identically to each institution. It is conceivable,
for example, that equal protection could subject state affirmative action
programs to strict scrutiny but federal programs to only intermediate scrutiny,
" Visiting Professor, University of Minnesota Law School (2005-06); Professor and Norman & Edna
Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. Comments from
Richard Briffault, Clay Gillette, Rick Hills, Laurie Reynolds, Rick Schragger and many other symposium
participants refined the arguments that appear in this Essay. Also, I'dlike to warmly thank Rick Schragger
for organizing a spectacular conference.
2 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying equal protection to
cities); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying equal protection to federal
government).
3 See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (applying establishment clause
t
to the legislature); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003)
(applying establishment clause to judicial action).
4 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (holding that the Establishment Clause is a
provision that "the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable with fullforce to the States and their school
districts") (emphasis supplied); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27 (1995) (equal protection rules apply equally as
between federal and state governments under the principle of "congruence").
5 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, discussed in Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case For
Tailoring ConstitutionalPrinciples,153 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1562-63 (2005).
6 See Rosen, supranote 5, at 1563-65.
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with the result that a federal program would be constitutional whereas an
otherwise identical state program would not.7
More generally, Surprisingly Strong Case critiqued the widespread
assumption that multi-institutional constitutional principles perforce are "OneSize-Fits-All" in respect of all the governmental institutions to which they
apply. Instead, the article argued that constitutional doctrine should be
receptive to the possibility that the different levels and branches of
government may be sufficiently different institutional contexts such that some
multi-institutional principles may apply differently to the different levels or
branches of government.8 Continuing to draw on sartorial metaphors, the
article suggested that doctrine should permit multi-institutional constitutional
principles to be "Tailored" to the different institutions to which they apply,
rather than conclusively presuming that multi-institutional constitutional
principles are "One-Size-Fits-All." Concretely, this means that, under a
Tailored approach, a constitutional principle applicable to both the federal and
state governments might permit states to regulate in ways that the federal
government cannot, or vice-versa. Similarly, a single constitutional
principle's application to municipalities might vary from the way it applies to
states and the federal government. Or a constitutional principle might apply
differently to the different branches of the federal government.
SurprisinglyStrong Case pointedly did not advocate that any particular
constitutional doctrine be Tailored, contenting itself with identifying a
plausible new doctrinal option that merits consideration. 9 This Essay picks up
where that Article left off, applying a jurisprudence of Tailoring to three
constitutional doctrines: term limits, speech restriction in relation to judicial
elections, and content-based speech regulations.
As this Essay shows, the awareness that multi-institutional constitutional
principles are not necessarily One-Size-Fits-All, but that they potentially can
be Tailored, brings about many benefits. It encourages careful thought about
the distinctive characteristics of the many different governmental institutions
found in our society. Tailoring potentially frees units or branches of
government from constitutional restraints that appropriately limit other units
or branches. Awareness of Tailoring helps one to see analogies and precedent
See id. at 1562-63.
To support its conclusion, the Article showed that neither the Supreme Court nor commentators
have offered a compelling theoretical justification for One-Size-Fits-All, that numerous Supreme Court
Justices have advocated that particular constitutional principles be Tailored, and that several contemporary
doctrines are best conceptualized as instances of Tailoring. The Article also identified numerous systemic
differences across the different levels of government that could justify Tailoring. See generally id.
' See Rosen, supra note 5, at 1581.
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that otherwise might be missed. Tailoring also brings to light underlying
normative questions that One-Size-Fits-All problematically obscures. By
doing all these things, the jurisprudence of Tailoring holds out the prospect
for generating more intelligent constitutional doctrine.
II. TERM LIMITS: A CRITIQUE OF U.S. TERMLMITS v. THORNTON
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,'0 the Supreme Court struck down an
amendment to Arkansas' constitution that set term limits for Arkansas' federal
representatives, which had been adopted by a state-wide referendum. I hope
to show here that what the Thornton majority called its "most important"
argument" was an illogical One-Size-Fits-All approach to a legal principle
identified in the earlier decided case of Powell v. McCormick.12 After
critiquing the Court's analysis in Thornton, I then analyze term limits with the
insights that Tailoring affords. I conclude that although Arkansas' term limits
provision was properly struck down, not all term limits would be
unconstitutional - a conclusion at variance with Thornton's analysis. This in
turn generates some concrete suggestions as to how term limits provisions
should be structured.
A. Critique
Because Powell figured so prominently in the Thornton Court's analysis, I
will briefly review the Court's holding in that case. After Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr. had been elected by a majority of citizens in New York's
Eighteenth Congressional District, Congress sought to prevent Powell from
taking his seat, ostensibly due to miscellaneous alleged ethical lapses on
Powell's part.13 The Supreme Court ruled that Congress was "without power
to exclude Powell from its membership."' 14 The Court relied, inter alia,on the
that "the people
"fundamental principle of our representative democracy"
15
them."'
govern
to
please
they
whom
should choose
To the extent that such a "fundamental principle" exists as a matter of
constitutional law,' 6 it was a thoroughly sensible one for the Court to rely
'0 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
See id. at 806.
12 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
13 Id. at 490-93.
14 Id.at 550.
"

Id. at 547.
'6 It is interesting to inquire as to the source of this "fundamental" constitutional principle. The Court
suggested that the principle was inferred on the basis of"basic principles of our democratic system." See
15
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upon in Powell. This is so because the additional ethical qualifications for
Representatives that Congress sought to impose on Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.
interfered with the choice that had been made by those who lived in Powell's
congressional district - the people whose preferences mattered in respect of
selecting their representative for Congress - that Powell should be their
representative. The members of Congress who tried to block Powell from
taking his congressional seat were not members of the relevant political
community in respect of selecting the Eighteenth Congressional District's
representative. Congress thus had interfered with the choice of the relevant
political community, running afoul of the principle
that "the people should
17
them.,
govern
to
please
they
whom
choose
Careful thought suggests, however, that Powell's "fundamental principle
of our representative democracy" did not seamlessly carry over to the
Thornton context in the manner the Thornton majority believed. Of critical
significance is that the amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution that
provided term limits for Arkansas' federal representatives had been passed by
a ballot initiative that won nearly sixty percent of the popular votes and -8
most importantly - that had carriedevery congressionaldistrictin the State.'
The term limits thus were imposed by the relevant political community upon
itself. As such, the term limits cannot be said to have interfered with the
relevant political community's ability to "choose whom they please to govern
them." To the contrary, term limits were an instantiation of this fundamental
principle.
Unfortunately, the Thornton Court specifically rejected the argument that
Powell's principle was inapplicable since the additional qualifications were
the product of a state referendum.19 This aspect of Thornton's reasoning is a
flawed "One-Size-Fits-All" approach to a constitutional principle that by its
nature must be Tailored. Thornton viewed Powell as standing for the
principle that additional qualifications for congressional eligibility violated
the "fundamental principle of our representative democracy," 20 but that is a
mistake. The principle that "the people should choose" was violated in
Powell not on account of the substance of the additional eligibility
id. at 548. Perhaps the principle that the "people should choose whom they please to govern them" could
be understood as a reverse incorporation of the Guaranty Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, though any
such suggestion would confront the challenge that the Court long has ruled that the Guaranty Clause is not
justiciable. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), aff'd by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17 Powell, 395 U.S. at 547.
1s U.S. Term Limits Inc. v Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'9 See id. at 820 ("[T]he source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification's
restrictive impact.").
20 See id.
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requirements, but because the requirements were imposed by political
"outsiders," that is, by people (i.e., members of Congress) who were not part
of the political community that appropriately selected who was to represent
the Eighteenth Congressional District.
In other words, Powell's "fundamental" principle is an antiextraterritoriality limitation. There are several others. 2' By their nature, antiextraterritoriality principles limit what polities can make political decisions,
not the substance of the political decisions.22 For this reason, a One-Size-FitsAll jurisprudence is illogical vis-A-vis anti-extraterritoriality principles.
Rather, anti-extraterritoriality principles must be Tailored.
My analysis might be challenged as follows: Although the holding in
Powell is not controlling in respect of state-imposed eligibility requirements,
perhaps Powell's holding is derived from a categorical constitutional
requirement that the relevant political community be able to select whomever
it wants to represent it. A study of the Constitution and well-established
precedent, however, conclusively shows that as a purely descriptive matter
there is no such categorical principle. To begin, the Constitution itself
establishes eligibility requirements that limit who can be elected to
Congress. 23 Moreover, the Court has upheld many state regulations that
interfere with citizens' ability to vote for whom they wish. For example, the
Court has upheld state statutes that require persons seeking ballot positions as
independent candidates for Congress or the presidency to have been
unaffiliated with a political party for at least one year prior to the primary
election.24 State statutes that "impose burdens on the development and
growth of third parties" and thereby aid the two-party system also have been
upheld. 25 Each of these state statutes that have the effect of limiting citizens'
voting choices have been upheld on the ground that the limitations facilitate
operation of the democratic process.26 Advocates of term limits similarly

21

This is true, for example, of the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities

Clause. See Rosen, supranote 5, at 1583.
22 For example, the dormant commerce clause does not proscribe protectionist legislation, only
protectionist legislation that is enacted by states. See id. at 1518.
23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
24 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 734-36 (1974).
25 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 378 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As
the Court has noted, "Mary features of our political system - e.g., single-member districts, 'first past the
post' elections, and the high costs of campaigning - make it difficult for third parties to succeed in
American politics." Id. at 362.
26 See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 736 (justifying the one-year unaffiliation requirement on the ground
that it protected the electoral process from splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism).
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argue that they facilitate representative democracy by eliminating the
entrenchment of incumbents. 2
In short, the jurisprudence of Tailoring serves two crucial roles in
analyzing term limits. First, it clarifies the scope of Powell's holding; stateimposed eligibility requirements are relevantly different from
congressionally-imposed eligibility requirements vis-i-vis the antiextraterritorial limitation found in Powell. Second, by spotlighting the true
constitutional question that is raised by term limits, the jurisprudence of
Tailoring illuminates additional case law that is relevant to analyzing the
question at hand. Importantly, this body of precedent reveals that voters do
not have a categorical constitutional right to select whomever they wish to be
their representative; limitations on who may run for office that are designed to
aid the operation of the democratic process repeatedly have been upheld.
B. Positive Implications
Although term limits are notperse unconstitutional under the fundamental
principle of our representative democracy that was identified in Powell, the
Arkansas amendment nonetheless was properly struck down under Powell's
principle. After explaining why this is so, this subsection explains how a
term limits provision could be structured so as to avoid running afoul of
Powell. To be clear, the analysis below does not purport to defend term limits
against all conceivable constitutional challenges.28 What it does is to show29
that the Thornton Court's self-acknowledged "most important[]" argument
does not lead to Thornton's conclusion that term limits per se violate the
Powell principle.
As shown above, the jurisprudence of Tailoring makes clear that whether a
particular congressional eligibility requirement (such as term limits) runs
afoul of fundamental democratic principles turns on what political community
imposes the limitation. This insight uncovers two problematic aspects of
Arkansas' term limits provision. First, although a majority of voters in every
congressional district had voted in favor of Arkansas' term limit
amendment, 30 this was a fortuity. Under Arkansas' ballot initiative law, a
ballot initiative must receive a majority of state-wide votes, not a majority of

27

See, e.g. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense ofState ConstitutionalLimits on FederalCongressional

Terms, 53 U. PI'. L. REv. 97, 143-51 (1991).
28 For an illuminating examination of some of the other challenges that can be made to term limits, see
id. at 102-51 (ultimately concluding that term limits are constitutional).
29 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995).
'0 Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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votes in each and every congressional district. 31 Powell's analysis makes
clear that the relevant political community for purposes of congressional
districts insteadis the congressional district itself. As structured, Arkansas'
state-wide initiative thus posed the danger of running afoul of the
fundamental principle identified in Powell.
32
For purposes of the as-applied challenge brought in Thornton, this
characteristic of the Arkansas voter initiative should not have doomed the
term limits provision to unconstitutionality since majorities in every Arkansas
33 Tailoring makes
congressional district had voted in favor of term limits.
clear, however, that rather than relying on fortuity, other states that wish to
pursue term limits should structure them differently than Arkansas': term
limits should be decided not on a state-wide basis, but on a congressional
district-by-congressional district basis, so that term limits are applicable only
them.34
in those congressional districts in which a majority of voters support
The second problematic aspect of Arkansas' term limits provision was not
remediable through serendipity. Implicit in Powell's principle is the
conclusion that any term limit requirement should be waivable in a
congressional district in which a contemporary majority no longer wished to
be bound by a term limits constraint. As structured, however, Arkansas'
amendment only could have been repealed by a majority of Arkansas citizens.
While this deficiency was fatal to Arkansas' term limits provision, it could be
overcome by structuring term limits provisions so that they can be activated
35
or deactivated on a congressional district-by-congressional district basis.

See ARK. CONST. amend. 7.
32 Though the statement in text oversimplifies matters, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
FacialChallenges and Third-PartyStanding, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1321 (2000) (providing an illuminating
analysis of the nature of as-applied challenges), the conclusion in text nonetheless likely is valid. Space
limitations preclude a more nuanced discussion of this issue here.
33 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting this fact).
34 There are several ways that this could be accomplished under state law. State law, either statutory
or constitutional, could delegate lawmaking powers to enact and repeal term limits to political subdivisions
that coincide with federal congressional districts. Alternatively, either state statute or constitutional
amendment could authorize the enactment and repeal of term limits subject to majority vote on a
congressional district-by-congressional district basis.
35 It is worth noting that the requirement that contemporary majorities (in a congressional district) be
able to deactivate a term limit does not mean that the term limit would have to be statutory rather than
constitutional. After all, a constitutional amendment itself could authorize opt-outs on a district-by-district
basis upon vote of a majority of voters in a district. Moreover, it is not the case that state constitutional law
is metonymic with supermajority rule. In fact, the states that currently permit constitutional amendments by
voter initiatives all require only a simple majority for adoption of constitutional amendment. See Lynn A.
Baker, ConstitutionalChange and DirectDemocracy,66 U. COLO. L. REv. 143, 148-49 & n.23 (1995).
31

230
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C. The Really Hard Questions Presentedby Arkansas' Term Limits.
Although this Essay does not purport to defend term limits against all

possible constitutional challenges, 36 it would seem that the most difficult
question presented by Arkansas' term limits amendment is the issue raised in
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the Thornton decision.3 7 Justice Kennedy
argued that nationwide uniformity with regard to congressional qualifications
is necessary because the elected officials will sit in the national legislature.
Put a bit differently, Kennedy's argument raises the following question: does
our nation's political culture require nationwide uniformity in respect of the

qualifications for who may run for Congress? 38 This in turn raises several
corollary queries: (1) what are the appropriate criteria for answering the

question of whether state-by-state variations in respect of term limits is an
acceptable aspect of American constitutional law?, (2) what institutions in
society properly play a role in answering that question?, and (3) what if any
judicial deference should be given to their judgments? I cannot hope to
answer these difficult questions here, but only to identify them as the core
considerations that properly guide the analysis of state-imposed term limits.
II. JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CODES: A CRITIQUE OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF
MINNESOTA V. WHITE

A. A Crucial Overlooked Question
In Republican Partyof Minnesota v. White,39 a 5-4 majority applied strict
scrutiny to strike down a state law that barred candidates for judicial office
from announcing their views on "disputed legal or political issues. ' 40 The
36

See text accompanying note 28.

37 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 838-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38 Cf Rosensupranote 5, at 1624-28 (noting that the determination of whether Tailoring is advisable
in any particular doctrinal context requires an analysis of whether the nonuniformity that Tailoring permits
is consistent with American constitutional culture).
39 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
40 See id. at 770 (quoting Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002)). The
crux of
the majority's holding was that Minnesota's Announce Clause was "woefully underinclusive" because it
"prohibit[ed] announcements by judges (and would-be judges) only at certain times and in certain forms."
Id. at 783. The majority's application of strict scrutiny in White was very exacting indeed. The Court's
conclusion that the Announce Clause was underinclusive turned largely on the fact that the Clause's
proscriptions were triggered only after a person announced her candidacy for office. In so concluding, the
Court rejected a highly plausible justification of this trigger, namely, "that judges feel significantly greater
compulsion.., to maintain consistency with nonpromissorystatements made during ajudicial campaign
than with such statements made before or after the campaign." Id. at 780. The Court declared that this
proposition

is not self-evidently true. It seems to us quite likely, in fact, that in many cases the
opposite is true.... In any event, it suffices to say that respondents have not carried
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four dissenting Justices also applied strict scrutiny, but they concluded that
Minnesota's so called "Announce Clause" was narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.41 The four dissenters and Professor
Richard Briffault rightly critique the majority's analysis for inadequately
distinguishing between elections for legislatures and the executive branch, on
the one hand, and judicial elections, on the other.42 I join this critique, which
in fact is a form of the Tailoring that I champion. Neither the dissenters' nor
43
Briffault's analysis, however, goes far enough. Both the dissenters and

Professor Briffault 44 adopt strict scrutiny without pausing to inquire whether it

appropriately applies in this context. A forthright consideration of the
appropriate level of review, which Tailoring invites, strongly suggests that a
lower level of review was appropriate.
To begin, Tailoring's sensitivity to institutional context opens one's eyes
to doctrinal options that otherwise can readily be overlooked. All the case
law relied on by the majority in support of strict scrutiny concerned speech
restrictions in the context of elections for legislative and executive officials.45
In other words, prior to the White decision itself, there was no case law that
spoke to what level of scrutiny applied to speech restrictions in relation to
judicial elections.
But is it plausible to draw a constitutional distinction between the context
ofjudicial elections, on the one hand, and legislative and executive elections,
the burden imposed by our strict-scrutiny test to establish this proposition (that
campaign statements are uniquely destructive of open-mindedness) on which the
validity of the announce clause rests.
Id. at 780-81. One is led to wonder precisely how a state legislature could carry so heavy a burden.
Furthermore, the Court's application of strict scrutiny in White sheds constitutional doubt on any
limitations ofjudicial speech. Because the Announce Clause's proscriptions were triggered only after a
person announced her candidacy for judicial office, a person was allowed to make public statements
regarding disputed political and legal questions before announcing her candidacy. Rejecting announcement
time as a legitimate trigger of the speech limitations would appear to mean that no limitation on candidate
speech could pass muster, for surely extending the Announce Clause's proscription to a time preceding the
candidate's publicized decision to run would be overinclusive. Professor Briffault makes a similar
observation. See Richard Briffault, JudicialCampaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 181, 209-10, 213-14 (2004).
4' See White, 536 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that Minnesota had a "compelling
interest in sanctioning" statements by judicial candidates that announce their views); White, 536 U.S. at
819 ("The Announce Clause ...is equally vital to achieving these compelling ends...") (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
42 See id. at 797-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 803-809, 813-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Briffault, supranote 40, at 206-08.
41 See White, 536 U.S. at 803-821.
See Briffault, supra note 40, at 206-08.
4
45 See White, 536 U.S. at 774-75.
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on the other? Both precedential and functional analyses suggest that such
line-drawing is plausible.
B. Precedentfor "Separation-of-Powers"Tailoring
Strong evidence that a constitutional principle might vary in its application
across the different branches of government exists in contemporary precedent.
The defendant/appellant in the 2001 case of Rogers v. Tennessee46 had been
convicted of second-degree murder and appealed on the basis that the victim
had died more than a year and a day after having been stabbed. At the time of
the crime, Tennessee unquestionably had a common-law "year and a day
rule," which precluded conviction of murder unless a victim had died by the
defendant's act within a year and a day of the act.47 The Supreme Court of
Tennessee abolished the "year and a day rule" and applied a new rule to the
defendant, 48 upholding the conviction despite the fact that fifteen months had
elapsed between infliction of stab wounds and the victim's death.4 9
The question presented to the Court in Rogers was whether such
retroactivity was constitutional. The Ex Post Facto Clause by its terms
applies only to state legislatures, 50 and the Rogers Court assumed that the
Clause would have been violated if the Tennessee legislature had abolished
5
the year and a day rule after the defendant had stabbed his victim. 1
Retroactivity limitations on courts are derived from due process, but the
Rogers Court held that it was "undoubtedly correct" that "the Due Process
and Ex Post Facto Clauses safeguard common interests - in particular, the
interests in fundamental fairness (through notice and fair warning) and the
prevention of the arbitrary and vindictive use of the laws. 52 The 1964
Supreme Court decision of Bouie v. City of Columbia had treated the
retroactivity limitations applicable to legislatures and courts in a One-SizeFits-All manner, stating that "[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post
Facto Clause from passing ...a law, it must follow that a State Supreme
Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same
result by judicial construction., 53 The Rogers Court specifically rejected
532U.S. 451 (2001).
Id. at 453.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 454.
50 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall... pass any... ex post facto Law.").
51 Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458; see alsoId. at 462 (restating, and not disputing, Justice Scalia's contention
46

41

that "there is no doubt that the Ex Post Facto Clause would have prohibited a legislative decision identical
to the Tennessee court's decision here").
" Id. at 460.
5' 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964).
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Bouie's One-Size-Fits-All jurisprudence, adopting instead a rule that treated
the state legislature and judiciary divergently: Rogers held that whereas the
legislature may not make changes in the criminal law subsequent to the
the judiciary is
criminal act that work to the defendant's disadvantage,
changes. 54
unforeseeable
making
from
only
prevented
C. Functional Considerationsfor Applying a Lower Level of Scrutiny
Functional considerations - the determination that two institutions are
principle5
sufficiently different such that a multi-institutional constitutional
Tailoring.
drive
what
are
each
to
appropriately applies differently
Functional analysis led Rogers to Tailor the constitutional principle of
fundamental fairness: the Court pointed to the "important institutional and
contextual differences between legislating, on the one hand, and common law
decisionmaking, on the other., 56 The Court has engaged in similar functional,

Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462 (holding that the judiciary can make changes to common law unless it is
the conduct in
"unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to
ground that
issue." (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354)). The Rogers Court then upheld the conviction on the
it "was not
law,"
common
the
of
relic
outdated
an
as
viewed
"widely
was
rule
because the year and a day
unexpected and indefensible" for the Tennessee Supreme Court to abolish it. Id. at 462.
The claim that Rogers is an example of Tailoring across the branches of government can be challenged
on the ground that each branch was governed by a different constitutional provision (the Ex Post Facto
Clause applied to the legislature and the Due Process Clause to the judiciary). That Rogers both confirmed
view that
that the same constitutional principles applied to both governmental institutions and rejected the
as an
decision
the
treating
justify
together
courts
and
legislatures
to
the principles applied identically
instance of Tailoring.
First,
One also might ask: if the Rogers Court indeed Tailored, why didn't the Court Tailor in White?
has
that
option
doctrinal
a
not
is
it
date
to
because
Tailoring
of
possibility
the Court typically overlooks the
(Justices
garnered much attention. See Rosen, supra note 5, at 1518. Second, four Justices in White
Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens) were willing to Tailor insofar as they were attentive to the
difference between judicial elections and elections for legislators and executives (although, as discussed
above in text, they did not consider whether such differences could justify a different level of scrutiny).
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who had joined the tailoring opinion in Rogers, joined the majority
is of
opinion in White for reasons unrelated to Tailoring. Justice Kennedy is a free speech absolutist who
be
the view that "content-based speech restrictions that do not fall within any traditional exception should
at
U.S.
536
White,
interests,"
government
compelling
or
tailoring
narrow
into
inquiry
invalidated without
793 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and Justice O'Connor is deeply skeptical of judicial elections, see Id. at
788-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55 See Rosen, supra note 5, at 1563-79.
56 Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460. The Court provided two reasons why the two institutions were
meaningfully different for constitutional purposes. First, constitutional constraints on the judiciary could
be less strict because courts are less susceptible to "political influences and pressures" since they only
"constru[e] existing law in actual litigation." Second, because the judiciary is responsible for the case-bycase development of the law, preventing courts from imposing retroactive rules would "unduly impair the
incremental and reasoned development of precedent that is the foundation of the common law system."
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460-61.
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institution-context analysis when it has opted to Tailor other multiinstitutional constitutional principles.5 7
Institution-sensitive analysis counsels the wisdom of Tailoring free speech
doctrine in a manner that would have applied something less than strict
scrutiny to Minnesota's judicial codes. The first subsection examines the
constitutional significance of what governmental institution was the source of
the speech code. The second subsection discusses the constitutional
significance of what societal institution was the regulatory object of the
speech code.
1. InstitutionalDistrust:Attentiveness to the Source of the Regulation
Our analysis appropriately begins with a consideration of why the Court
applies strict scrutiny to content-based regulations. Unfortunately, the Court
has not provided much in the way of explanation as to why it has chosen strict
scrutiny as opposed to some other standard with regard to content-based
regulations. 8 Scholars have stepped into the justificatory void. 9 Professor
David Strauss has provided the powerful suggestion that strict scrutiny for
content-based regulations is a doctrine that reflects "the Court's assessment of
the institutional capacities of the actors involved: the legislatures and the
courts.

6 0

Strauss' thesis that the level ofjudicial scrutiny is correlated to ajudgment
concerning the capacities of the institution regulating the speech 61 is
particularly strong because it accounts for domains of free speech doctrine
that otherwise can be difficult to explain. For example, content-based
regulations made by military officials - who are part of the government and
unquestionably are subject to the First Amendment 62 - are subject to less
57 See Rosen, supra note 5,at 1562-79.
59 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions ofSpeech Because of its Content: The Peculiar
Case of

Subject-MatterRestrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 100-01 (1978) (noting that "surprisingly scant attention
has been paid to the... question why, within the realm of possible abridgments of free expression, we are
so especially wary of restrictions based upon content. On the rare occasion when the question does come
up, the answer is all too often simply taken for granted."); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity ofProphylactic
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 199 (1988).
59 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 58, at 101-07; Strauss, supra note
58, at 199-202; but see Martin H.
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114 (1981)
(advocating that the distinction between "content-based" and "content-neutral" first amendment analysis
should be abandoned).
60 Strauss, supra note 58, at 200.
61 For a similar approach, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional
Rights of Private
Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 144 (2003); seegenerally Mark D. Rosen, OurNonuniform Constitution:
GeographicalVariations of ConstitutionalRequirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1129
(1999).
62 See, e.g. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
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than strict scrutiny. 63 As the Court has explained, "courts must give great
deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular interest" because courts are "ill-equipped to
determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have." 64 Similarly, although public school principals
unquestionably are governmental actors to whom the First Amendment
applies, the Court has ruled that principals are "entitled to regulate the
of
contents" of school newspapers and can "refuse to sponsor" a broad swath
65 - far
unacceptable viewpoints as long as such regulations are "reasonable"
less searching judicial review than strict scrutiny. As with military
regulations, the Court justified a lower level of scrutiny of school officials'
speech regulations on the basis of the specific institutional character of public
schools. 66
Tailoring's institution-sensitive analysis suggests that the concerns that
have given rise to strict scrutiny of most content-based speech regulation were
not present in the White case. Professor Strauss justifies strict scrutiny for
content-based legislation on the ground that institutional characteristics of
legislatures render them susceptible to being influenced by "hostility or
67 Tailoring's sensitivity to
favoritism toward certain kinds of speech.,
institutional differences suggests that a fact mentioned by the White Court
only in passing was of crucial doctrinal significance: the judicial code at issue
in White had been promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, not the
legislature. 68 To the extent that courts are institutionally less susceptible to
hostility or favoritism toward certain kinds of speech - and indeed, on
traditional accounts of the judicial function, courts are deemed the most
trustworthy government institutions in regard to protecting speech - Strauss'
justification for strict scrutiny of content-based legislation does not carry over
to court-promulgated guidelines.
Indeed, careful consideration of Minnesota's Announce Clause confirms
that it reflected neither hostility nor favoritism toward certain speech. The
regulation did not keep certain categories of information from the public or
See e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 739 (1974) (upholding military ban on speech that is
"intemperate, ... disloyal, contemptuous and disrespectful" on XX level of review).
' Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986).
65 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270, 272 (1988).
to censor student speech,
66 See id. at 272 (positing that if school principals did not have such powers
instrument in awakening
'principal
a
as
role
their
fulfilling
from
constrained
"the schools would be unduly
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954))).
the child to cultural values ....
67 Strauss, supra note 58, at 202.
68 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
63
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otherwise interfere with the public's access to information about substantive
issues, but only limited the ability of certain persons - those running for
judicial office - from indicating their views on contested subjects. In short,
the Announce Clause did not keep content from the public, but instead limited
what societal actors could provide certain content to the public. For this
reason, the code did not have other qualities that the Court and scholars have
suggested justify strict scrutiny: the Announce Clause did not reflect the
government's "disapproval of the ideas expressed, ' 69 the code was not a
governmental effort to suppress particular ideas, 70 and the Announce Clause
was unlikely to "distort the ordinary workings of the 'market-place of ideas'
in a content-differential manner., 71 For all these reasons, the fact that the
Announce Clause did not attempt to limit others in society from discussing
the contested legal and political issues, but restrained only the candidates,7 2
confirms that the Announce Clause is not the sort of regulation that merits
strict scrutiny.
2. Substantive Plausibility:Attentiveness to the Object of the Regulation
Tailoring's spotlighting of the question as to the appropriate level of
review facilitates recognition that yet another common justification for strict
scrutiny was absent in White. The Court has suggested that strict scrutiny is
appropriate when the regulation under review is of a sort that is unlikely to be
legitimate.73 If indeed there is no reason to presume that regulations of
judicial candidates' speech are illegitimate, yet another justification for strict
scrutiny disappears.
A threshold question concerns the appropriate level of generality at which
the regulation is to be described for purposes of ascertaining whether the
regulation is of a sort that is likely to be illegitimate. For example, is the
Announce Clause an "abridgement of the right to speak out on disputed
issues" in the undifferentiated context of the "electoral process"? 74 Or is the
regulation's likelihood of legitimacy (as a threshold determination of what
6

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).

70 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-6 (3d ed. 2000).

Stone, supra note 58, at 101.
Unlike the analysis in the text above, Professor Briffault interprets the code's inapplicability to
"business groups, labor unions, trial lawyers, and other interest groups" counting against the code's
constitutionality. See Briffault, supra note 40, at 206.
"' See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) ("Indeed, the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 88 (2002) (supporting the view that strict scrutiny is appropriate where
statutes "are likely to reflect prejudice that renders the democratic process untrustworthy.").
74 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781 (2002).
71
72
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level of review is to be applied) to be assessed by characterizing it as a speech
regulation in the specific context of judicial elections? Assimilating the
Announce Clause to the undifferentiated context of elections casts immediate
suspicion on it, for precedent clearly and sensibly establishes that "[t]he role
that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that
they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public
importance. 75 By contrast, conceptualizing the Announce Clause as a
regulation ofjudicial elections invites a careful, context-specific inquiry in
which precedent concerning the regulation of election of legislators and
executives is not necessarily relevant.
Tailoring embraces the latter context-specific analysis. Elsewhere I have
explained at length why such institution-sensitive analysis is better suited to
76
generate intelligent constitutional doctrine. In addition, it is worth noting
that the position advanced here (that the Court should have Tailored in White)
is not so wildly revolutionary or implausible to be unlikely to fall on receptive
judicial ears. The White dissenters themselves undertook institution-sensitive
7 Furthermore, there is precedential
analysis, as did Professor Briffault.
support for Tailoring free speech principles to different institutional contexts.
For instance, content-based regulations have been upheld by means lower
than strict scrutiny in the institutional context of the military and public
schools, 78 and speech principles have been held to permit content-based
79
regulations in the context of elections.

Id. at 781-82 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)).
See Rosen, supranote 5,at 1580-1629.
77 The dissenting Justices in White embraced a Tailored approach to analyzing the Announce Clause.
the
See White, 536 U.S. at 797-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for "obscuring
at
U.S.
536
White,
branches");
political
the
and
judicial
the
for
campaigns
fundamental distinction between
dissenting) ("the rationale underlying unconstrained speech in elections for political
803-809 (Ginsburg, J.,
act atits
office - that representative government depends on the public's ability to choose agent who will
supra
Briffault,
See
Briffault.
Professor
did
So
bench").
the
for
behest- does not carry over to campaigns
note 40, at 184 (arguing that "[i]f campaign practices that are unexceptionable (or even constitutionally
on the
protected) in the context of legislative or executive elections have a distinct and harmful impact
campaigns").
election
judicial
in
judicial function, then they can be restricted
in the military context); Rosen,
'8 See Rosen, supra note 61, at 1148-9, 1152-56 (noting Tailoring
supra note 61, at 1159-61 (identifying Tailoring in public schools).
79 SeeFrederick Schauer and Richard H. Pildes, ElectoralExceptionalism and the FirstAmendment,
argument
77 TEX. L. REv. 1803, 1809-19 (1999). I do not wish to overstate matters. Although the
contemporary
to
foreign
completely
not
is
Tailored
have
should
Court
the
that
Essay
this
in
proffered
not
American jurisprudence, it represents a plea for doctrinal change, for most speech doctrine is
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institutionally-sensitive. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirstAmendment, 89 MINN.
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most
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doctrine
Amendment
First
contemporary
that
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REV. 1256 (2005)
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Asking whether speech limits in the context of judicial elections are the
sort of regulations that are unlikely to be legitimate yields an answer in the
negative because the policy considerations behind the Announce Clause are
quite equipoised.80 To understand why such speech regulations are not so
implausible as to trigger strict scrutiny, it first is necessary to appreciate the
logic ofjudicial elections. Although Article IIIjudges have life tenure,8 1 most
state judges are subject to periodic elections.8 2 The primary justification for
judicial elections is to increase the degree to which judges, and the judicial
process more generally, are democratically accountable. 83 Holding judges
accountable in some form is non inimical to American constitutionalism.
Non-Article III federal judges typically have fixed terms that are renewable
by other governmental actors.8 Indeed, Article III judges' life tenure is
subject to the check of impeachment, which is interpreted by some members
of Congress as permitting them to consideration the judge's substantive
85
decisions.
The question thus is not whether non-Article III judges are to be
accountable, but what institutions are to be entrusted with holding them
accountable. Whereas the federal system largely leaves judicial checks to the
coordinate branches, most states leave it to the people themselves through the
institution of elections. Although at least one Supreme Court Justice has
expressed deep distrust of state judicial elections,8 6 basic principles of
federalism, 87 as well as longstanding federal court reluctance to determine
soFor a fine discussion, see Judith Resnik, JudicialSelection and Democratic Theory: Demand,
Supply andLife Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 579,590-97 (2005); see alsoBriffault, supra note 40, at 197202.
"I See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1.
82 As Richard Briffault has noted, "[t]he votes of the people select or retain at least some judges in
thirty-nine states, and all judges are elected in twenty-one states. By one count, 87% of the state and local
judges in the United States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office."
Briffault, supra note 40, at 181.
83 See Briffault, supra note 40, at 193.
84 For example, the judges who sit on the Court of Military Appeals are appointed by the executive
branch, see Note, MilitaryJusticeandArticlelll, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1909, 1913 (1990), bankruptcy judges
are appointed and reappointed for 14-year terms by the United States Court of Appeals, see 28 U.S.C. §
152(a)(1) (2005), and judges on the Tax Court are appointed by the President for 15 year renewable terms,
see 26 U.S.C. § 7443(b), (e) (2005).
85 This is a controversial view of what factors appropriately are taken into account in Congress'
exercise of its impeachment powers. Further, what criteria may inform impeachment determinations may
not be justiciable under the political question doctrine. I shall not further pursue these difficult but
interesting questions here.
86 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-92
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,463 (1991) (referring to the "the authority
of the people of
the States to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials" as "an authority that
lies at the heart of representative government" and that "is a power reserved to the States under the Tenth
Amendment and guaranteed them by that provision of the Constitution under which the United States
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what qualifies as a republican form of government, 88 together suggest that
states should be free to structure their judiciaries as they deem to be
appropriate.89
If there are good reasons to conclude that states should be permitted to
have their judges selected via election, it readily follows that states should
have wide latitude to regulate judicial elections. This is so because
mainstream elections (i.e. elections of legislative and executive officials) are
highly regulated affairs. 90 Indeed, in the context of elections, free speech
doctrine permits all sorts of regulations that would be impermissible in the
general domain of public discourse. There are limits on what voters are
permitted to express at the ballot box; mandatory disclosure obligations on the
identity of political speakers; content-based regulations of electoral speech,
ranging from mundane constraints like electioneering near polling places to
ones, like selective bans on contributions from some
more dramatic
91
speakers.
These regulations of speech have been allowed on the ground that they
facilitate the electoral process.92 As is true with elections of executive and
legislative officials, states have imposed all sorts of regulations on judicial
93
elections, of which speech regulations are but a part. Judicial elections can
imperil rule of law values if judicial candidates are viewed as promising
certain judicial outcomes in exchange for votes. The Announce Clause
addresses this risk by aiming to preserve the impartiality and the appearance
of impartiality of the state judiciary while maintaining the institution of
judicial elections.94 Understood in this broader context of constitutional
accommodation of speech regulations in elections, judicial speech codes

'guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4)).

8' See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), discussed in Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
89 Indeed, the ready tendency to impeach state deviations from the federal model simply because they
deviate from the federal system may be particularly misplaced here, for state courts may well play a
different role in state governments than federal courts play in the federal government. See Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Goodfor Localism? The Localist Casefor FederalRegimes, 21 J.L. & POL. XX

(2005) (hypothesizing that unlike their federal counterparts, state courts use state constitutions in manner
that invites both legislative and popular responses, that this is a good thing, and that this is possible because
state constitutions are far more easy to amend than the federal Constitution and because judges are
democratically accountable through elections).
90 See generally Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The ConstitutionalizationofDemocratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REv. 28 (2004).
91 Schauer & Pildes, supranote 79, at 1816.

92 I look more closely at several of these cases infra starting at ***
93 See generally Briffault, supra note 40, at 209-33.
9 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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simply are not the sort of regulation that in all likelihood is illegitimate and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny's strong presumption of unconstitutionality.
Yet another substantive dimension of the Announce Clause suggests that it
is not the sort of regulation that should be subject to strict scrutiny on account
of its high likelihood of illegitimacy: How a person evaluates the merits of
judicial speech codes likely turns on her conception of the judicial role. She
is more likely to favor speech codes if she believes that there is a strong
distinction between politics and law and that judges "are not political actors"
but simply "must strive to do what is legally right.. ."9 After all, what is the
harm of disallowing judicial candidates from announcing personal views that,
on this view of the judicial role, are irrelevant to judging? Call this the
"Judging as Law" approach. On the other hand, a person is inclined to be
normatively skeptical of judicial speech codes to the extent she thinks that
judges "possess the power to 'make' common law" as well as "the immense
power to shape the States' constitutions as well."9 6 Call this second view,
which rejects the "complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of
representative government," 97 the "Judging as Politics" approach. If Judging
as Politics is a more accurate understanding ofjudging, then limitations on the
speech of judicial candidates deprives the public of information highly
relevant to making an informed judgment of a judicial candidate's
98
qualifications.
That a person's normative evaluation ofjudicial speech codes is a function
of one's antecedent conception of the judicial role, along with the fact that
there are several plausible competing conceptions of the judicial role, together
counsel in favor of a modest standard of federal judicial review regarding
state legislation that is premised on one of these competing conceptions.
Stated differently, judicial speech codes implicate policies about which
reasonable people disagree more than they implicate policies that properly are
subject to strict scrutiny's strong presumption of unconstitutionality.

9' Id. at 805-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 798 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("In a democracy,
issues of policy are properly decided by majority vote" and "every good judge is fully aware of the
distinction between the law and a person point of view").
96 Id. at 784 (majority opinion).
97 Id. at 784 (rejecting the view that there is a "complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise
of representative government").
98 The majority and dissenting Justices in White held very different conceptions of the judicial
function: Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority embraced (surprisingly) the "Judging as Politics"
approach, see id. at 784, whereas Justice Ginsburg reflected the "Judging as Law" approach, see id. at 806
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding these differences, each Justice hegemonically asserted that her
conception of the judiciary was self-evidently correct. Justice Stevens, it should be pointed out, adopted a
more modest form of the "Judging as Law" approach than did Justice Ginsburg. See id. at 784 n.12.
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Deeply entrenched federalism commitments provide yet another reason
why strict scrutiny is inappropriate in relation to judicial speech codes. The
level of judicial review chosen should encourage rather than obstruct states'
different approaches with regard to issues as to which there can be good faith
disagreement. Deferential federal judicial review is particularly appropriate
when such good faith disagreement manifests itself in different methods for
structuring state government9 9 (i.e., whether to have judicial elections, and if
so how such elections should be regulated), and when the state choice itself
(i.e., judicial speech codes) is "relatively new to judicial elections," as the
majority opinion acknowledged. 00
D. Revisiting Some Election Law Precedents
To reiterate, the discussion here is not intended to establish that the
Announce Clause was constitutional, but only to challenge the widely held
but unargued assumption that such speech regulations appropriately were
subject to strict scrutiny. Tailoring makes clear that the unique institutional
context ofjudicial elections potentially could give rise to the conclusion that
the governmental regulations that define that context properly are subject to a
different level ofjudicial review than regulations outside that context. Once
one's eyes are opened to this possibility, some earlier decided case law begins
to look different: it becomes evident that the Court already has Tailored
constitutional principles in the elections context, thereby strengthening this
Essay's argument that Tailoring can occur in the context ofjudicial elections,
as well.
To begin, the Court has explicitly Tailored at least one constitutional
principle across different governmental institutions in the context of elections.
Although the guarantee of equal protection prohibits both the federal
government and the states from conditioning a citizen's right to vote on
property ownership, the Court held in Ball v. James °1 that there are types of
02
local government that are not barred from utilizing property-based franchise'
despite the fact that they are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause. 10 3 The Tailoring occurs as between "general" state and
federal governments, on the one hand, and "special-purpose unit[s] of
99 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,463 (1991).
'o0 See White, 536 U.S. at 786.
1'0451 U.S. 355 (1981). This was not the first time the Court had so held. See Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
102 See Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
13 See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355,362-63 (198 1) (water reclamation district); Lane v. Town of
Oyster Bay, 603 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (sanitation collection districts).
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government" (such as water reclamation districts), on the other.'0 4 The Court
has justified Tailoring on the basis of a functional analysis that takes account
of the institutional differences between general and "special-purpose"
governments: because special-purpose units of government "affect[] definable
groups of constituents more than other constituents," the Court05 permitted
voting schemes that allow only those primarily affected to vote.1
Awareness of the possibility of Tailoring sheds light on other cases that are
relevant to the judicial speech codes at issue in White. In Burson v.
Freeman,'0 6 the Court upheld content-based but viewpoint neutral speech
restrictions that prohibited the solicitation of votes within one hundred feet of
the entrance to polling places on election day. Though the plurality opinion
in Burson purported to apply strict scrutiny, 0 7 it is more plausible to
characterize the opinion as having applied less exacting scrutiny. As Justice
Stevens persuasively argued in a dissent that was joined by Justices O'Connor
and Souter, the 100-foot ban at issue in Burson was not narrowly tailored.
Tennessee's ban extended to more than 30,000 square feet, whereas other
states were able to maintain order with solicitation bans that encompassed less
than 8,000 square feet.108 "Moreover, Tennessee's statute does not merely
regulate conduct that might inhibit voting; it bars the simple display of
campaign posters, signs, or other campaign materials. Bumper stickers on
parked cars and lapel buttons on pedestrians are taboo too. The notion that
such sweeping restrictions on speech are necessary to maintain the freedom to
vote and the integrity of the ballot box borders on the absurd."10 9 The
dissenters in Burson also cast doubt on whether Tennessee had demonstrated
a compelling interest in its broad ban on vote solicitation. The solicitation
ban had been introduced a century earlier' 10 "as part of a broader package of
elector reforms" including the secret ballot and regulation inside the polling

104

See Ball, 451 U.S. at 362-63. More specifically, while the equal protection clause subjects general

governments' voter regulations to heightened scrutiny (which encompasses the requirement of one-person,
one-vote), see Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975), voter requirements for special-purpose units are
subject to the far more deferential "reasonable relationship" requirement (which does not include the oneperson, one-vote requirement). See Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
'0' Ball, 451 U.S. at 363.
'06 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
107 See id. at 198 ("As a facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, [the
regulation] must be subjected to exacting scrutiny: The State must show that the 'regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' (quoting Perry Ed.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45(1983))).
'o' See id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'09 Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11oSee id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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place, but there was no evidence that the solicitation ban was necessary today
in view of the success of the other components of electoral forum."'
The plurality's holding in Burson accordingly is best construed as resting
on a standard of review more deferential than strict scrutiny.
Reconceptualizing Burson in this matter would not render it a wholly sui
generis free speech decision, for the Court elsewhere has subjected contentbased restrictions to less than strict scrutiny. 12 Tailoring's focus on the
appropriate level of scrutiny makes clear that the Burson case - which in fact
was referenced in the course of the majority's opinion in White" 3 - could
have supported the proposition that Minnesota's judicial code should have
been subject to some lower level of scrutiny. Quite clearly, the Burson Court
ban than the White
gave far more deference to Tennessee's solicitation
4
majority gave to Minnesota's judicial codes."l
E. Implications
The preceding analysis suggests that some alternative to strict scrutiny most likely intermediate scrutiny or a balancing test 15 - would have been
more appropriate in White. The Announce Clause analyzed in Minnesota v.
White still may have failed on even this lower level scrutiny for the reasons
ably provided by Professor Briffault.1 6 But such lower level scrutiny would
not have endangered other, more confined judicial codes regulating speech
such as Pledge or Promise clauses and Commit or Appear to Commit clauses,
White.17
both of which have been jeopardized under the Court's reasoning in
1 Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (applying a balancing
test and upholding ban on government employees' receipt of honoraria for speaking engagements); United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding Hatch Act's
ban on political activities by public employees, using a level of scrutiny lower than strict that subsequently
has been described by the Court as a balancing test, see Nat'l Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. at 467).
11 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. at 786.
114 Compare White's exacting application of strict scrutiny (discussed supra note 40) with the far more
deferential approach that the dissenting opinions in Burson persuasively demonstrate was taken by the
majority in that case.
...The Court used what is best described as intermediate scrutiny in the Burson case and has used
balancing tests to analyze some other content-based regulations. See supra note 112. For present purposes
I seek to establish only that there were good reasons for the Court to apply less than strict scrutiny, leaving
for another day the determination of what specific test would have been appropriate. In fact, selecting the
appropriate legal test is a complex process that typically receives inadequate attention from both the Court
and commentators. For some scholars who have made this very important point, see RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 47-52 (2001); Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecisionRules,
90 VA. L. REv. 1, 92-97 (2004).
116Briffault, supra note 42, at 203-209.
112 See United States

.. Id. at 209-33.
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III. ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY ORDINANCES: A CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN
BOOKSELLERS ASSOCIATION V. HUDNUT

In the well known decision of American Booksellers Association v.
8
Hudnut,"1
the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Easterbrook) struck down an
Indianapolis ordinance that, inter alia, prohibited the trafficking of
"pornography," which the ordinance defined as "the graphic sexually explicit
subordination

of women

.

.119

The

court found the ordinance

unconstitutional because it "discriminate[d] on the ground of the content of
the speech." Explained the court, "[t]he state may not ordain preferred
forbids the state to declare one
viewpoints in this way. The Constitution
120
opponents."'
silence
and
right
perspective
This final section of this Essay critiques the Hudnut opinion from the
vantage of Tailoring, showing that the court's analysis problematically did not
take account of what level of government was regulating. To be candid, the
analysis that follows is the hardest case for Tailoring of the three doctrines
explored in this Essay. This is because similar arguments were advanced by
Justice Jackson and Justice Harlan' 21 but never adopted by the Court.
Furthermore, the argument that follows is the most normatively controversial,
for the ordinance at issue in Hudnut was a content-based speech restriction
that was not viewpoint neutral.
My intention here is not to argue that the Indianapolis ordinance was
constitutional, but to identify the problems that result from an analysis that
ignores what level of government has sought to regulate. It turns out that
foundational free speech concerns are implicated differently depending upon
whether a regulation has come from the federal government or a city. This
section catalogs the competing value judgments that properly inform the
decision of whether free speech doctrine concerning content-based regulations
should be Tailored. Determining how to reconcile these competing value
judgments is considerably more complex than the Hudnut court's One-SizeFits-All analysis suggests. By laying bare the (what is best called) political
judgments that necessarily inform the decision of whether these free speech
principles should be Tailored, Tailoring exposes a very difficult question that
must be answered along the way: what societal institutions properly play a
role in determining whether free speech principles are to be Tailored? Space
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aftd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
Id. at 324.
120 Id. at 325.
121 See Rosen, supranote 5, at 1558-60.
18
"9
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limitations permit this Essay to identify, but not to seek to answer, this very
hard question.
A. Critique
The Hudnut court's central argument was premised on an unstated and
undefended One-Size-Fits-All assumption. The Seventh Circuit stated as
follows:
Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television,
reporters' biases - these and many more influence the culture
Yet all is protected as
and shape our socialization ....
answer leaves the
other
speech, however insidious. Any
government in control of all of the institutions of culture, the
great censor and directors of which thoughts are good for
12 2

US.

Such governmental control, the Seventh Circuit wrote, raises the specter of
totalitarianism:
Totalitarian governments today rule much of the planet,
practicing suppression of billions and spreading dogma that
may enslave others. One of the things that separates our
society from theirs is our absolute right to propagate23
opinions that the government finds wrong or even hateful. 1
The Seventh Circuit accordingly held that the Indianapolis ordinance flatly
aims at
violated the commonly identified notion that free speech2 doctrine
4
orthodoxy.
ideological
governmentally-created
a
resisting
at 330.
at 328.
'24 See id. An important statement of this "anti-orthodoxy" view appears in Justice Jackson's well
known opinion in West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943): "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics.... Justice Jackson's poetic words have helped generate a first amendment ideology
of "no-orthodoxy." See generally Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CH.-KENT L. REv. 625,
628-34 (2003) (noting and critiquing this); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH,
122 Hudnut
123 See id.

ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 6 (2001) (concluding that "governmental

paternalism in the regulation of expression is inherently inconsistent with the fundamental democratic
notions of individual dignity and societal self-rule.")(footnote omitted); Julian N. Eule and Jonathan Varat,
TransportingFirstAmendment Norms to the PrivateSector: With Every Wish There Comes A Curse, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1542 (1998) (describing the "core" of free speech the "proscription against
government imposed orthodoxy").
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The Hudnut court's concerns are very real if the federal government is the
regulator, 2 5 for federal regulation typically imposes nation-wide rules, and
nation-wide speech regulations intended to shape citizens' values clearly raise
the specter of government-created orthodoxy.
But such concern of a
government created orthodoxy is misplaced if only some lower levels of
government regulate. In fact, rather than leading to the single-minded,
totalitarian society that the Hudnut Court feared Indianapolis' ordinance could
create, permitting small polities to regulate such matters may well have led to
a more diverse society.
How so? Permitting localities to regulate such things as pornography
would have led to a broader array of political communities than exists in the
post-Hudnut world insofar as there would have been polities that regulated
pornography and others that did not. Such diversity among polities may
facilitate a broader array of citizen perspective and in that way advance free
speech values. Whether political diversity leads to more diverse citizen
perspectives ultimately turns on empirical considerations, including perhaps
most importantly the nature of human beings' character development. The
most sophisticated justifications for pornography regulation are premised on
the assumptions that people are significantly socialized by their social
environment and that society's laws are an important contributor to and
definer of the socializing environment. In the view of such "political
perfectionists, ' 126 government regulation is a component of the environment
that is necessary to produce fully developed human beings. 127 Conversely,
governmental inaction (for instance, permitting the distribution of
pornographic materials) may prevent the generation of fully formed citizens.
If perfectionist assumptions concerning human nature are correct, then the
result of a constitutional regime that allows some localities (but not the
federal government) to ban pornography will be a citizenry that, in the
nationwide aggregate, has broader ideological diversity than would a
constitutional doctrine that disallowed all polities from banning pornography.
Diversity across polities accordingly can be said to further rather than
undermine the First Amendment
goal of guarding against the creation of a
28
singular national orthodoxy.
125 See
126

infra p. 38, discussing Justice Harlan's dissent in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
For a more detailed consideration of the structure of "political perfectionist" thought, including its

connection to Aristotelian political theory, see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community SelfGovernancein ResidentialAssociations,Municipalities,andIndian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1053, 1064-71 (1998).
127 See, e.g., CATHERINE MCKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
128

Cf Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the DoctrineandDiscourseofReligious Liberty,

117 HARv. L. REv. 1810, 1823-31 (2004) (making similar argument in respect of religious freedom).
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Indeed, constitutional doctrine that disallows differences across sub-federal
polities, and thereby prevents political perfectionists from translating their
political commitments into action, itself may threaten First Amendment
values insofar as such doctrine may create a nation-wide ideological
orthodoxy. If perfectionists' assumptions concerning human character
development are correct, then constitutional doctrine that guaranteed that
citizens across the country will be raised in non-perfectionist polities will
create a national orthodoxy of incomplete human beings who have been raised
in polities that do not undertake appropriate values-inculcation.
More generally, Tailoring constitutional doctrines to the different levels of
government advances several of federalism's promises of enhancing liberty
and facilitating experimentation.1 29 Government regulations are a form of
public good, and a constitutional doctrine that expands the range of polities
(e.g., that gives room for both "perfectionist" and "non-perfectionist" polities)
increases the range of options among which citizens can choose. Regulatory
variations at the municipality level (rather than state or federal) create 30a
situation where exit costs from one polity to another are relatively low,'
increasing the extent to which citizens can be said to have real choices in
selecting the polity that reflects their public good preferences.' 31 As Professor
Robert Cooter recently has argued in his intriguing book "The Strategic
Constitution,"
[i]n general, escaping jurisdiction by a less comprehensive
government is easier than escaping jurisdiction by a more
comprehensive government. Differences in the cost of exit
from different levels of government justify different degrees
of vigilance by courts in protecting individual liberties ....
The 'exit principle' implies the 'federalism of individual
rights,' by which I mean that courts should tolerate more
interference with individual liberty when the effects are
localized.

129 For
130 For

32

a nice statement of these values, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991).
an explanation as to why exit costs from smaller polities are smaller than exist costs from larger

polities, see Rosen, supra note 5, at 1606-08.
13' For the classic statement of this position, see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Although Tiebout's thesis has been subject to both empirical
and normative critiques, Tiebout's central claims have been empirically verified. See Rosen, supra note 5,
at 1608-12.
132 ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 323 (2002). For a brief discussion of some of
the insufficiencies of Cooter's account, see Rosen, supra note 5, at 1611-12.
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The Seventh Circuit's One-Size-Fits-All approach, by contrast, deprives
political perfectionists of the liberty to live in polities that provide the public
goods that they believe are necessary to create full human beings. Relatedly,
the court's One-Size-Fits-All approach forecloses the chance of testing
political perfectionists' empirical claims concerning character development.
B. Objections to Tailoring ConstitutionalLimits on Speech
This section identifies and responds to two powerful objections to the
Tailoring contemplated in my analysis of Hudnut.
1. Costs to our PoliticalCulture
The first objection is that content-based, non-viewpoint neutral regulations
are categorically inconsistent with Americans' foundational political selfidentity. The Court probably accurately captured contemporary American
sensibilities when it stated in PoliceDepartmentv. Mosley that "above else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message [or] its ideas ....,3 The fact that the
United States apparently stands alone in this regard - that virtually every
other liberal democracy permits the regulation of certain expression on
account of its content 134 - is no response if, in fact, the First Amendment
means "no message policing" for today's Americans.
Careful consideration may well lead to the conclusion that governmental
policing of messages is categorically unacceptable and that free speech
principles accordingly should not be Tailored across the different levels of
government. Even so, the jurisprudence of Tailoring would have been useful.
Tailoring exposes that One-Size-Fits-All is not axiomatic. This understanding
underscores that normative commitments, rather than jurisprudential
necessity, underwrite any conclusion that free speech principles should be
treated in a One-Size-Fits-All manner in this circumstance. Such clarity is
good, for it is important to be aware of the assumptions upon which one's
position rests.
On the other hand, normative analysis may lead to the conclusion that
Tailoring is desirable in this situation. The first step to understanding the
plausibility of such a conclusion is the recognition that First Amendment
doctrine presently is more nuanced in respect of governmental policing of
"' 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
'34

See generally Frederick

Schauer,

The Exceptional First Amendment,

http://ssrn.con/abstract=668543 (February 15, 2005).

available at
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messages than Hudnut's and Mosley's rhetoric suggest. Though the First
Amendment "embodies our profound national commitment to the free
exchange of ideas," and while it is true that "as a general matter, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content," the
Supreme Court also has noted that 35"this principle, like other First
Amendment principles, is not absolute."'
Indeed, free speech doctrine permits government to restrict a non-trivial
quantum of expression on account of content. Not only may American
137
36
but
governments regulate obscene materials1 and fighting words,
"contentenact
13
espionage,
constitutes
government may ban speech that
39
based advertising restrictions" in relation to the sale of securities,' prohibit
4
the advocacy of illegal activities,1 enact "content-based [regulations] of
[labor union] elections and election campaigns - including restrictions on
accurate representations by employers about the future consequences of
unionization,"' 14 1 and more. 42 These doctrines are in tension with the Seventh
Circuit's suggestion that Americans have an "absolute right to propagate
43
opinions that the government finds wrong or even hateful"' and to Mosley's
flat assertion that "government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message [or] its ideas .... " 1,44 More importantly for present purposes, the
recognition that our free speech jurisprudence already tolerates some
governmental policing of messages illuminates that the normative claim that
local governments should be permitted to regulate pornography constitutes a
plea for extending current doctrinal approaches rather than an argument for
creating a completely sui generis and unique doctrinal exception.
Another indication that the prospect ofgovernmental policing of messages
is not flatly absurd - and, more specifically, that lower levels of government
might be given greater leeway to regulate the content of speech - is that this
1 Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564,573
136 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).

(2002) (internal quotation omitted).

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
139 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1770 (2004).
140 See id. at 1778-80.
141 Id.at 1782.
112 See id.at 1781-83 (discussing permissible speech regulations in the context of antitrust, copyright,
trademark, and sexual harassment law).
143 American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,328 (7th Cir. 1985). For what arguably
is another counterexanple, see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362-63 (2003) (upholding Virginia's ban
on cross burning with intent to intimidate).
'" 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
137See

138See,
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position has been advocated by several Supreme Court Justices. Justice
Harlan argued in his dissent in Roth v. United States' 45 as follows:
The danger is perhaps not great if the people of one State,
through their legislature, decide that 'Lady Chatterley's
Lover' goes so far beyond the acceptable standards of candor
that it will be deemed offensive and non-sellable, for the
State next door is still free to make its own choice. At least
we do not have one uniform standard. But the dangers to free
thought and expression are truly great if the Federal
Government imposes a blanket ban over the Nation on such a
book .... The fact that the people of one State cannot read
some of the works of D. H. Lawrence seems to me, if not
wise or desirable, at least acceptable. But that no person in
the United States should be allowed to do so seems to me to
be intolerable, and violative
of both the letter and spirit of
46
1
Amendment.
First
the
In short, Justice Harlan concluded that the First Amendment could tolerate
state regulation of expression on the basis of content (what is deemed to be
"offensive"). Justice Jackson argued in his dissent in Beauharnaisv. Illinois
that states had greater leeway than the federal government to "protect the
private right to enjoy integrity of reputation" by means content-based
regulations known as libel laws, 147 and then-Justice Rehnquist similarly
argued in his concurrence in Buckely v. Valeo that the First Amendment may
48
impose greater restrictions on the federal government than on the States.
That several Justices have advocated that lower levels of government may
police messages in ways that federal government cannot powerfully supports
the proposition that the Tailoring of free speech principles to permit lower
level polities to enact content-based regulations is not absurd.
History provides definitive support to the proposition that the policing of
messages by lower levels of government is not flatly unthinkable to American
constitutionalism. As recently as the early twentieth century, content-based,
14' 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146 id.
147 See

343 U.S. 250, 294-95 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). For a more complete discussion of
Justice Harlan's and Justice Jackson's approaches to what I dub "Tailoring," see Rosen, supra note 5, at
1558-60.
14S See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in
part), discussedin Rosen, supra note 5, at 1561.
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non-viewpoint neutral regulations designed to proscribe speech that had 49a
speech principles.
"bad tendency" were deemed to be consistent with free
For instance, writing for the Court before the First Amendment had been
formally incorporated, 150 Justice Holmes in Pattersonv. Colorado"assume[d]
that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were protected from
' 15
but also of the states 1
abridgments on the part not only of the United States
but nonetheless upheld a state court's contempt order that had been issued
against the publisher of an article and cartoon that were "intended to
embarrass the court."'5 2 Holmes wrote that although "the main purpose of
such constitutional provision is to prevent all such previous restraintsupon
publications," they do not prevent "subsequent punishment of such as may be
public welfare[,]" even where what was publicly
deemed contrary to 1the
53
true.
been
had
stated
Consistent with Patterson, early twentieth century courts applied the socalled "bad tendency" approach to free speech to uphold state laws designed
to prevent dissemination of information that the government deemed to be
harmful to the public. In 1907, for instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld a state law that barred newspapers from providing details of
executions "beyond the statement of the fact that such convict was on the day
in question duly executed according to law.... ,,s The court acknowledged
that the newspaper regulation had been adopted to "surround the execution of
criminals with as much secrecy as possible, in order to avoid exciting an
unwholesome effect on the public mind[,]" but nonetheless upheld the law
against claims that it violated state constitutional protections of the press and
speech. 55 The court-held that "liberty of speech and of the press [] imply not
only liberty to publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and
punishment for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character..
,156 If material "naturally tends to excite the public mind and thus indirectly

49 See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 132-46 (1997).
1soThere is some dispute among scholars as to when free speech was incorporated against the States,

though the consensus is that it did not occur prior to 1925. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 18 & n.a (3d ed. 2001).
151Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462 (1907).
"' Id. at 459.
153 Id. at 462

(emphasis in original, internal quotation omitted).
v. Pioneer Press Co., 110 N.W. 867 (Minn. 1907). This intriguing case was brought to my
attention in Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 571,575 (1998) (reviewing DAVID M.
154 State

RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997)).
155 PioneerPress, 110 N.W.
IS6 Id. (emphasis supplied)

at 868.
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affect the public good" or otherwise is "detrimental to public morals,"
157
however, then government can regulate its publication.
There is no question that our country's early history with constitutional
principles of free speech is very different from the way speech regulations are
doctrinally handled today.15 8 The question is what to make of the Court's
doctrinal voyage from the "bad tendency" test to Mosley's averment that
"above else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message [or] its ideas .... , 159 Two general
approaches to this doctrinal change can be identified. The first is to view the
contemporary approach as unquestionably superior to what preceded. The
battle has been fought and won; the earlier era's First Amendment
jurisprudence was mistakenly thin, and its eclipse is a good thing. 60 The
second approach is to situate our country's severe doctrinal shift from "bad
tendency" to Mosley in historical context. As is suggested by the Seventh
Circuit's analysis in Hudnut,which linked the anti-pornography ordinance to
totalitarian governments' "suppression of billions and spreading dogma that
may enslave others[,]' 16 1 contemporary free speech doctrine's (apparent)
wholesale rejection of governmental efforts to socialize its citizens may be a
reaction to the twentieth century totalitarian regimes against which our nation
as a political culture defined itself.162 The fact that those regimes largely have
fallen away suggests two related things: we as a society perhaps can modulate
our rejection of all they stood for and look to see if there may be merit in any
aspects of their political systems.
In short, free speech principles have not always been metonymic with
government disability to police messages. Our country's past tolerance of
content-based regulations, as well as its current non-zero tolerance for such
regulations, together counsel that the question of whether government should
have the power to regulate the dissemination of information is more
normatively complex than Hudnut's and Mosley's absolutist sloganeering
suggests. 163 This brief Essay does not purport to make out the full case for
'
IS!

Id. at 868-69.

The person most responsible for uncovering this aspect of our country's constitutional history is

David Rabban. See RABBAN, supra note 149.
IS9

408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

,60For such an approach, see RABBAN, supra note 149.
161American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985).
162 This is not to deny that certain court decisions during the McCarthy era threatened what today are
deemed to be core free speech principles, see generallyMARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MCCARTHY ERA (2005). Nevertheless, the Court's free speech jurisprudence as a
whole during the second part of the twentieth century created a doctrinal regime that for the most part is
intolerant of governmental policing of messages.
16 See also Steven J. Heyman, Spheres ofAutonomy: Reforming the Content NeutralityDoctrine in
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governmental power to regulate content, but is content to make two points:
the case for permitting some such regulations is not trivial, and a conclusion
that municipalities can regulate content does not invariably lead to the
64 Importantly,
conclusion that higher levels of government can so regulate.
these two propositions are interrelated insofar as the latter point (Tailoring's
insight) may well affect how people think about the former (normative)
question.
2. The Oddity of "Interactive" ConstitutionalDoctrine
One of the main reasons provided above for Tailoring free speech
principles as between the federal government and sub-federal polities is that
federal regulations have nation-wide effects whereas one sub-federal polity's
regulation leaves other sub-federal polities free to "make [their] own choice"
65 But what if
and decide not to ban Lady Chatterley's Lover (for example).
Even if such an
all sub-federal polities decided to ban such a book?
fatal to any
outcome
an
such
of
possibility
eventuality is unlikely, is the
proposal to Tailor free speech principles?
Recognizing such a possibility makes clear that free speech principles can
be Tailored only if it is possible to ensure that constitutionally-protected
materials are reasonably accessible to people who wish to obtain them. This
final section of the Essay explores how this condition can be satisfied.
For present purposes I will assume, pace Justice Harlan, that free speech
principles would be violated if offensive materials could be proscribed on a
state-wide basis. In my view, states are too large, and the exit costs
associated with either traveling or altogether moving out-of-state are too
66
great, to support a "federalism of individual rights"' with regard to speech
regulations of this kind at the state level. Rather, the patchwork of varying
speech regulations would be constitutionally permissible only if (1)any such
regulations were the products of sub-state polities (most likely
municipalities), and if(2) the regulations were not adopted by large numbers
of contiguous sub-state polities.
Let us focus on the second condition that bans not be adopted by numerous
contiguous sub-state polities. Without such a limitation, it would be possible
for there to be a vast expanse of territory within which certain materials
FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 647 (2002).
for treating local
164 And indeed, for the reasons suggested above, there are principled reasons
of speech
purposes
for
governments as different institutional contexts than the federal government
regulation.
16sRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" See COOTER, supra note 132, at 323.

The Journal of Law & Politics

[VoI.XXI:223

simply could not be obtained. This second condition implies that the
constitutional permissibility of City A's speech regulation may be a function
of the speech regulations of its neighboring polity City B. Let us dub doctrine
of this sort - in which what one polity's powers are a function of another
polity's regulations - "interactive" constitutional doctrine.
Is the fact that Tailoring free speech principles would require the creation
of interactive constitutional doctrine fatal to any proposal to Tailor free
speech?
I think not. Interactive constitutional doctrine is neither as
conceptually nor doctrinally novel as it may first appear. Any need to create
interacting constitutional doctrine entailed by Tailoring free speech principles
accordingly does not mean that Tailoring free speech is per se unthinkable or
67
unconstitutional. 1
To begin, interactive constitutional doctrine is susceptible of being
characterized as being no different from the ordinary doctrine that regulates
the powers of a single polity. This is because it is well established that substate polities (such as counties and municipalities) do not have independent
legal status, but instead are creatures of state law that accordingly have only
those powers that are granted by the state. 68 Consequently, interactive
constitutional doctrine can be conceptualized as a limitation on the powers
that the state can delegate to its sub-state polities; it is a federal constitutional
limitation that disallows a state from granting all its municipalities the power
to ban offensive materials, but instead allows a state to delegate such
regulatory powers only to a' subset of its sub-state polities. 69 In this sense,
what I have dubbed "interactive constitutional doctrine" is nothing more than
a limitation on the power of states.
Moreover, interactive constitutional doctrine is not as novel as it may at
first seem because variations of regulatory powers across sub-state polities in
a single state is not particularly unusual. Such variations frequently are
realized through the creation of so-called "special districts," that is, sub-state
polities created under authorizing state statutes that are granted special powers
and responsibilities.170 School districts and water reclamation districts are two
167 The analysis that follows does not address the normative question of whether the creation of such
doctrine is worth the effort - what is ultimately a pragmatic question that would have to take full account of
the potential benefits Tailoring free speech principles. See Rosen, supra note 5, at 1630-34 (noting that the
downsides of Tailoring constitute pragmatic considerations rather than categorical requirements).
'6' The classic statement of this can be found in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,207 U.S. 161, 178-79
(1907). For a sophisticated dissenting perspective, see David J. Barron, The Promiseof Cooley's City:
Traces ofLocal Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 487 (1999).
169 State constitutional limitations, such as proscriptions on special legislation,
may limit the ways
states can accomplish this. In the next paragraph in text I provide a suggested approach that likely would
not run afoul of such constitutional limits.
170 See generally Richard Briffault, OurLocalism:PartI- Localism andLegal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
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examples. Each type of special district has regulatory powers that differ both
from the regulatory powers of other types of special districts and from
municipalities. It is conceivable that a state statute could authorize the
creation of a limited number of "anti-pornography" or "perfectionist" special
districts that enjoyed augmented regulatory powers in relation to speech (e.g.,
the power to ban offensive materials).
Variations in regulatory powers also can be found across municipalities. A
review of one prominent instance of such variations provides an additional
suggestion as to how regulatory variations across sub-state polities can be
implemented. Although the Mount Laurel decision famously held that the
New Jersey state constitution required that every "municipality must, by its
land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate
variety and choice of housing... at least to the extent of the municipality fair
' 71 state law
share of the present and prospective regional need therefore,'
of their constitutional "fair share"
permitted municipalities to sell a portion
172
municipalities.
other
to
obligations
Three lessons emerge from the Mount Laurel. First, Mount Laurel is an
example of regulatory authority varying across municipalities; those polities
that sold allowable amounts of their fair share obligations had greater leeway
to zone in a manner that made it infeasible for low income people to afford to
live in their municipality than did the municipalities that purchased such fair
share obligations. Second, the allocation of regulatory authority was
undertaken by means of the market. There are several market mechanisms that
similarly could be utilized to allocate municipal regulatory powers to ban
offensive materials. 173 Third, state law provided a baseline requirement that
ensured that a certain number of low income homes would be available.
Analogously, federal constitutional requirements would determine the
minimum extent to which offensive materials would have to be available.
Alternatively, interactive constitutional doctrine can be conceptualized as
an analog to zoning. What is parceled out by the state government is not a
private actor's license to build certain structures in certain locations, but substate polities' powers to regulate. Such "zoning" of regulatory powers in
REv. 346, 375-78 (1990).
171 S.Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975).
172 See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township ofBemards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) (describing and upholding
New Jersey's Fair Housing Act of 1985).
173For example, the state itself could either sell or auction "perfectionist" regulatory rights.
Alternatively, the state could grant all municipalities the entitlement to regulate in perfectionist ways
subject to a background requirement that offensive materials be available within a specified distance and
then permit the municipalities to negotiate for the rights among themselves.

The Journalof Law & Politics

[Vol.XXI:223

relation to constitutional rights is unusual but not unprecedented. In City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 74 the Supreme Court upheld regulations
that had the effect of permitting adult motion picture theaters to be located in
only a small area (approximately five percent) of a city.175 Thus although the
Court held that adult theaters showing "offensive" but not obscene materials
could not be wholly banned, it was constitutionally permissible for a city to
ban them in most of its geographical space,
Interactive constitutional doctrine builds on and reworks City ofRenton's
analytics. City of Renton suggests that materials that the Constitution does
not permit government to altogether ban may be proscribed throughout most
of a polity so long as the materials are available somewhere. Interactive
constitutional doctrine likewise envisions a circumstance where materials may
be barred in one geographical zone only if they may be obtained in another.
Interactive constitutional doctrine diverges from City of Renton, however,
insofar as City of Renton ruled that the municipality is the relevant polity
within which an adult theater must be able to be found. Interactive
constitutional doctrine presupposes that some sub-state polity larger than the
municipality is the appropriate geographical space within which materials that
cannot constitutionally be altogether banned must be available.
The City ofRenton Court did not explain why the municipality, rather than
some larger sub-federal polity (such as the county), should be the relevant
polity within which the material must be accessible. The normative
considerations that weigh in favor of decentralizing political power counsel in
favor of defining the relevant locus of accessibility to offensive materials at a
polity larger than the city: doing so expands the range of political
communities that are available in the United States (thereby augmenting the
extent to which federalism can achieve its twin benefits of giving citizens
wide and real choices among political communities and allowing experiments
in radically different social policies) and increases the extent to which citizens
can exercise self-governance (particularly in relation to issues about which
they're likely to feel very strongly, which in turn is likely to intensify citizen
176
participation).
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U.S. 41 (1986).
See id. at 53-54 (upholding zoning regulation that permitted such business to be located only in 520
acres of the entire city).
176 For a more complete consideration of these benefits, see
generally Mark D. Rosen,
Extraterritorialityand PoliticalHeterogeneityin American Federalism,150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 886-91
(2002) (considering federalism's benefits regarding diversity of political communities); GERALD E. FRUG,
RICHARD T. FORD, & DAVID J. BARRON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 866-905 (3d ed. 2001) (considering
the benefits of citizen participation in politics at the local level).
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It might be objected that extending the Renton rule to some super-city level
(such as the county) would not bring any of these benefits to citizens because
political diversity would be quashed at the county level. Any such critique,
however, is bottomed on an empirical claim regarding the interchangeability
of cities and counties that likely is mistaken. It seems probable that citizens
identify more strongly with the municipality in which they live than their
county. Even if offensive materials constitutionally must be available
somewhere within Cook County, Evanstonians are likely to view the question
of whether the city of Evanston should ban offensive materials as politically
significant and accordingly are likely to participate when the city considers
such an ordinance. Likewise, a city-wide ban may hold out the prospect of
creating a sufficiently large space within which perfectionists can comfortably
live and have an opportunity to put their social visions into (what for the rest
of society may be an experimental) practice. At the same time, Tailoring
constitutional doctrine so that offensive materials must be available
somewhere in the county gives expression to foundational free speech
principles and arguably does not unduly interfere with the marketplace of
ideas insofar as the materials banned in Evanston still can be obtained without
too great an inconvenience should a person really so desire.
I do not pretend to suggest that determining whether free speech principles
should be Tailored is a simple decision. At the end of the day, whether
Tailoring in this context is desirable would appear to turn on contestable
political commitments: does our country's commitment to free speech
mandate that no polity across the nation be permitted to ban offensive
materials? The major point here is that deciding that the First Amendment
bars Congress from enacting bans on offensive materials does not ineluctably
lead to the conclusion that sub-federal polities are similarly constrained.
Whether or not free speech principles should be Tailored is a hard question
that implicates substantive political commitments, and the question of whether
First Amendment principles should be Tailored ought to be forthrightly
debated in such terms.
IV. CONCLUSION

Tailoring rejects the common tendency to presume that multi-institutional
constitutional principles apply identically to the various governmental
institutions to which they apply. The failure to Tailor sometimes is flatly
illogical. Tailoring's institutionally sensitive constitutional analysis always
holds out the prospect of securing benefits of federalism and of separation of
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powers that can be lost if constitutional principles are willy-nilly applied in a
One-Size-Fits-All manner. Tailoring also facilitates recognition of instructive
lines of case law that can be easily overlooked.
By illuminating that case law decided in one institutional context may not
seamlessly transfer to a different governmental context, Tailoring spotlights
points where precedent gives out and choices must be made among options
that One-Size-Fits-All ignores. To be sure, the doctrinal possibilities
uncovered by Tailoring raise difficult questions. Determining whether a
particular constitutional provision should be Tailored demands careful
thought about the institutional characteristics of the different levels and
branches of government. Frequently, Tailoring's ultimate desirability will
turn not only on such institutional-sensitive analysis, but also on contested
normative commitments. This insight naturally raises the question of what
governmental institutions properly play a role in answering the normative
questions that underlie the decision of whether or not to Tailor. One-SizeFits-All jurisprudence avoids these complex questions, but at the cost of
unreflectively answering them in a manner that hides the fact that decisions
had to be made.
This Essay showcases these insights of Tailoring through careful analysis
of three constitutional doctrines. The Thornton decision's One-Size-Fits-All
approach to Arkansas' term limits was illogical. Tailoring makes clear that
the provision nonetheless was properly stricken, but illuminates why stateimposed term limits are not per se unconstitutional. The Essay then
identified, but did not seek to answer, the difficult normative questions that
are raised by state-imposed term limits.
Next, the Essay showed that the majority and dissenting decisions in the
White case, along with one particularly perspicuous commentator,
problematically neglected to critically consider what standard of review
should be applied to Minnesota's "Announce Clause." The strict scrutiny
precedent that was relied upon by all these legalists concerned speech
regulations enacted by legislatures in respect of elections for legislative and
executive officials. Yet there are solid functional reasons to conclude that
regulations drafted by courts in relation to judicial elections should be subject
to less than strict scrutiny. Moreover, Tailoring's forthright inquiry
concerning the appropriate level of review reveals that some case law
supports the adoption of less than strict scrutiny in this context. The
Announce Clause may still have been unconstitutional under less than strict
scrutiny, but a lower level of scrutiny would not have endangered the many
other regulations of judicial elections that White has jeopardized.

2005]

InstitutionalContext in ConstitutionalLaw

259

Finally, the Essay showed that the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Hudnut
problematically failed to take account of the fact that the anti-pornography
regulation had been enacted by a municipality. Tailoring so as to permit substate polities (but not states or the federal government) to enact content-based
regulations may advance rather than impede foundational free speech values.
Hudnut'sunreflective adoption of One-Size-Fits-All in relation to free speech
principles was unjustified on functional, precedential, and historical grounds.
The court's unexamined One-Size-Fits-All approach also obscured the
difficult normative questions that are raised by the question of whether free
speech principles should be Tailored. If a One-Size-Fits-All approach to free
speech doctrine is to be defended, it must be done by direct normative
argumentation.

